Energy vs. the Environment by Lewis, Tracy R.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA. CALIFORNIA 91125
ENERGY VS. THE ENVIRONMENT 
Tracy Lewis .... 
r,1\1 UTE OF ,� ,.� �+� G.: � \, 
� t::: - 0
:5 � . . -4 ... 
� � 
� " 
"'""" ,� SlfALL IA .. �\. 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 126 
May 1976 
ENERGY VS. THE ENVIRONMENT 
Tracy Lewis 
California Institute of Technology 
ABSTRACT 
Optimal development programs that explicitly account for 
the environmental impacts of extracting and consu.ming energy
resources are analyzed, Following Lee and Orr (1975) we allow 
for the possibility of storing the resource above ground once it has 
been extracted. When environmental disruption results from 
resource extraction (as in the case of strip mining) or there are
environmental costs associated with resource consumption (for 
example, the social costs of air pollution from fuel consumption)
then the socially optimal rates of resource consumption and 
extraction depend on the severity of the environmental impact and
on the prospects of storing the resource above ground. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Energy development and enviromnental preservation are 
two important current national priorities. 
1 
Unfortunately, the two 
goals are son1etimes incompatible with each other. 
2 
Certain lands 
are valued both for the natural resources and the environmental 
amenities they provide. Normally, productive inputs with multiple 
uses, like land, pose no real problems in a competitive free market 
economy. Use of the land goes to the highest bidder, the one for which 
the land is presumably most valuable. However, conservationists 
argue that with regard to the environment, the market is plagued with 
externality problems that preempt efficient resource allocation. 
Extraction activities like strip n1ining, deep hole mining, drilling 
1. One has only to look at the proliferation of new federal agencies 
(like the EPA, FEA and ERDA) to deal with energy and environmental 
problems, at the quantity of new environmental and energy research 
projects and at the wealth of related literature to appreciate the public 
attention focused on these two goals. Of course public attention may 
soon shift to some other issues long before our energy and environmental 
problems are resolved. See the paper by Downs ( 19 72) entitled: "The 
Is sue-Attention Cycle and the Political Economy of Improving Our
Environment" for an interesting discussion of this point. 
Z. Environmental and energy development interests have already 
collided on numerous issues including: the possible destruction of wild­
life and the natural environs caused by the Alaskan pipeline, oil spills 
caused by offshore drilling, the destruction of the natural topography 
resulting from strip mining , p ossible underground wate r contaminatio n 
in ge othe rmal de velo pment, and so forth. 
2 
for oil and natural gas, and geothermal development may have adverse 
impacts on the natural environment during and even after the process 
has ceased. On the other hand, consumption activities like fuel 
burning contribute to air and water pollution. Consequently, 
government intervention is required to represent the interests of 
conservationists in decisions trading off environmental quality for 
energy development and consumption. 
In what follows, we present an analysis of optimal resource 
allocation programs that explicitly account for environmental 
impacts. The rate of extraction and consumption for an exhaustible 
resource, like coal or oil, is chosen to maximize the discounted 
stream of the net economic returns. Primary attention in the paper 
is given to the case where environmental disruptions result from 
extraction. Under these circumstances, a fixed cost, independent of 
the extraction rate is incurred at each instant while the resource is 
being mined. This cost which captures the value of�recreational 
and environmental services foregone because of mining, can be 
avoided only once extraction ceases and the environment is re store d 
3 
to its original state. The effects on resource depletion of 
considering environmental impacts in extraction decisions is 
considered for two sets of circumstances. First for resources such 
as petroleum, we assume the resource must be consumed at the 
same rate it is pumped from the ground since the costs of storage 
are prohibitive. Second, following the analysis of Lee and Orr (1975) 
we assume above ground storage is feasible and that it is possible to 
3. We assume environmental extraction costs, at least to a 
first degree approximation, are independent of the level of the 
extraction process. For example, the reduction in the recreational 
and environmental appeal of certain areas due to the construction of 
an oil well or the opening of a mine is independent of the rate of 
resource extraction. We also assume that environmental effects 
are not irreversible. Once the mine is closed or the oil we ll is 
removed the environment can be restore d to its original state. 
Fisher et al ( 1972) and Arrow and Fishe r ( 1975) analyze situations 
whe re e conomic de ve lopment cause s irreve rs:ible e conomic damage s. 
accumulate resource inventories. Lee and Orr show that if the unit 
extraction cost as a function of output is U- shaped, it may be 
economical to store resources as optimal extraction may exceed 
consumption in certain time periods. The U- shaped cost curve 
naturally occurs in our model as a result of the fixed environmental 
cost incurred each period. 
3 
In both the storage and no storage cases the inclusion of 
environmental extraction costs in the analysis serves to increase the 
rate of resource withdrawal and decrease the duration of the 
extraction process. If storage is impossible, consumption rates 
also increase and the resource is totally exhausted in a shorter time 
period. This suggests that in unregulated competitive markets, 
where environmental costs from extraction, are typically ignored, 
resources are being used at a slower than optimal rate. 4 If storage
is feasible, we show that with environmental costs that resource 
consumption remains the same (increases) if marginal storage costs 
are constant (increase with larger inventories). Next, we 
demonstrate that increases in unit storage costs decrease the rate 
of extraction, but increase the rate of resource consumption. 
For situations where there are adverse environmental 
impacts from resource consumption a per unit tax on resource use 
is levied to reflect external damages, The effect of the tax is to 
decrease the rate of resource consumption in both the storage and 
no storage cases. This is in contrast to the situation where the 
environmental costs from extraction cause a more rapid rate of 
resource use. 
4. For interesting discussions of resource use under competitive
conditions see Peterson (1972), Stiglitz (1974), and Weinstein and 
Zeckhauser (1975). 
THE GENERAL MODEL 
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL EXTRACTION COSTS 
Resource Demand 
There· exists a fixed and presumably known quantity Q0 of
the resource. We are interested in socially desirable programs of 
resource exploitation, and the optimality of the consumption stream 
4 
is measured by the discounted sum of consumer plus producer surplus, 
In each period the demand function for resource consumption is 
p(t) = r/J(q(t)) ; r/J I < Q 
where q(t) is the rate of resource consumption in period t and p(t) 
is the price. For now we will assume there are no environmental 
( 1) 
costs from using the resource. Consequently the value of resource 
consumption or consumer surplus is represented by 
S(q(t)) = J q(t) ¢(g)dg
0 
(2) 
(subject to the usual proviso of constant marginal utility of income).
Assuming storage is possible let e(t) and I{t) be the rate of extraction 
and the rate of change in resource inventories, I(t), in period t. Then 
q(t) = e(t) - I (t) (3) 
or I (t) = e(t) - q(t); inventories decrease (inc.l,'ease) as consumption 
rates exceed (fall short of) extraction rates. 
Extraction and Storage Costs 
The variable costs of extraction are represented by C(e(t))
with C1, c" > O. 5 Fixed costs are incurred at a positive rate, F,
5. We are abstracting from "depletion effects 11 that cause extraction
costs to rise as the resource stock diminish.es. 
as compensation for the recreational and environmental services
preempted during the extraction process. Storage costs are 
represented by W(I(t) with W' > 0 and w" ;;, O. 
Objective Function 
Following Lee and Orr (1975) we can represent the present 
value of returns for an extraction and consumption program by 
( T 
. rt 
5 
TT = Jo 
l {S(e(t) - I (t)) - C(e(t)) - F - W(I(t))}e - dt
+ 1T z {S( - i (t)) - W(I(t))} e -rtdt 
(4) 
Tl 
where r is the constant social rate of discount, T 1 and T 2 are the
extra�tion and consumption time horizons, respectively, T 1 � T 2 and
e(t), I(t) and I(t) ;;, O. Note that environmental fixed costs, F, are 
incurred during the entire time horizon [O, T 1 ].
OPTIMAL PROGRAMS WITH NO STORAGE 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL EXTRACTION COSTS 
If above ground storage is not possible, the resource is 
extracted at the desired consumption rate. Once the extraction process 
begins environmental costs occur. Implicitly these costs represent a 
charge for leaving the resource in the ground until the time it is to be 
consumed. Naturally as environmental or underground storage costs 
increase, there is an incentive to hasten the extraction process to 
avoid costs. 
To establish this formally, first we derive the conditions 
for an optimal extraction program choosing e(t) and T 1 to maximize
TT subject to the resource availability constraint
lTl 0 e(t)dt Qo (5) 
Note that with no storage I(t) = 0 and e(t) = q(t) for all t. The first 
order conditions for a maximum include the Euler equation, 
6 
I I -rt {S (e(t)) - C (e(t))}e = A. te(O, T 1] (6) 
(where A. is the LaGrange multiplier attached to eq. (5)), the resource 
availability constraint, the nonnegativity of e(t), and the termina.l time 
d. . 6 con ition 
{ 
. } -rT S(e(T 1)) - C(e(T 1)) - F e 1 A. (7) 
The multiplier A. is the value of having an additional unit of the resource 
available. Equation (6) indicates that in each period the present value 
of net returns are balanced off against the foregone value of future 
returns resulting from current extraction. 
Differentiating equation (6) with respect to time we obtain 
S
1
(e(t)) - c ' �e(t ) )  } < o. e(t) = r { S "(e(t)) _ c ' (e(t)) 
Combining equations (6) and (7) we obtain 
(S(e(T1) - C(e(T1)) - F)/e(T1)
' ' 
S (e(T 1)) - C (e(T 1))
(8) 
(9) 
Thus according to equations (8) and (9) over the extraction horizon 
e(t) falls steadily to e(T 1 ), the rate at which average and marginal
returns are equated. Consider the optimal programs corresponding 
to different levels of fixed costs F 1 and F 2 with F 1 < F 2• Let 
[ e(t, F 1), T 1(F1)} and [ e(t, F 2), T 1 (F 2)} be the corresponding controls
for these programs. Since both programs must satisfy the resource 
constrai�n�t����������������� 
6. Equation (7) is derived by maximizing TI subject to eq. (5) with 
respect to T 1. 
7 
IT l(F 1) T 1
(F2) 
0 e(t, F 1)dt = 1 e(t, F 2)dt (10) 
By a change of variable we have
[El(O,Fl) 
Je(T 1 (F 1))
+- de
-e 
fe(O, F 2) :fde 
e(T 1 (F 2)) 
(11) 
noting that from equation (8) - e is a positive function of e. Implicitly
differentiating equation (9) we obtain de(T 1(F))/dF > 0 establishing
that e(T1(F2)) > e(T1(F 1)). But this implies th at e (O , F2) > e(O,F1) 
since the integrand on both sides of (11) is the same. Consequently
equation (8) implies e ( t, F 2) > e(t, F 1) for tE [O, T1(F 2)
] and equation
(10) therefore implies that T1(F2) < T1( F1 ). 7•8 
The effect of accounting for environmental impacts in 
extraction decisions is to increase the rate of resource depletion. 
This conclusion is bound to be questioned by those arguing that 
nonreplenishable resources are already being consumed too rapidly. 
The possibility of above ground storage, however, allows us to 
extend the consumption horizon for resources, as demonstrated in 
the next section. 
7. To see that e( O, F 1 ) < e(O,F2) implies e(t, F 1) < e(t,F2)
rewrite eq. (6) as 
I I rt I I [S (e(t)) - C (e(t))} - e {S (c(O)) - C (e(O))} = 0 
and differentiate implicitly with respect to e (0) to obtain
rt II II de(t) _ -e (S (e(O)) - C (e(O))} > 0 
de(O) - - (S11(c(t)) - C11(e(t))}
. 
8. Burness (1976) and Schmalensee (1976) has derived similar
results in different contexts. 
OPTIMAL PROGRAMS WITH STORAGE
AND ENVIRONMENTAL EXTRACTION COSTS 
For most resources above ground storage is possible at 
8 
some positive cost, This allows for an additional degree of freedom 
in extracting and distributing the resource for consumption over 
time. Nat urally, with increases in environmental or under ground 
storage costs there is still an incentive to speed up the extraction 
process, However, now consumption and extraction rates need not 
coincide. Resource consumption may be deferred to a more opportune 
time through storage. 
The conditions for an optimal program with storage are 
derived by choosing e(t), q(t), T 1 and T 2 to maximize TT subject to
the resource availability constrain equation (5). Assuming an interior 
solution the first order conditions for a maximum include the Euler 
equations, 9 
f I I } -rt [ ] tS (q(t)) - C (e(t)) e = A.; tE 0, T1 ( 
12) 
d · 1 -rt 1 -rt ] dt{S (q(t))e } = W (I(t))e ; t E [O, T2 ( 13) 
the resource constraint, equation (5), the nonnegativy of e(t) q(t) and 
I(t), the boundary conditions I(O) = I(T2) = 0 and the terminal time
d. . 10 con itions 
I 
(C(e(T 1)) - F) /e(T 1) C (e(T 1)) (14) 
S (q(T-2)) = 0. ( 15)
9.  We are assuming that extraction proceeds fast enough relative 
to consumption so that the nonnegativity constraint on I(t) is not binding. 
10. Equations (14) and (15)  are derived (after some substitution
and rearrangement) by maximizing iT subject to equation (5) with 
respect to T 1 and T 2.
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Effects of Environmental Costs on Optimal Programs 
Along with Lee and Orr (1975) let us assume (for now) that 
total storage costs are proportional to inventory size and thus 
W(I(t) ) = a I(t) ; a > O. Then, proceeding as in the no storage case
we can demonstrate the "speeding-up" effect of increasing environ-
11 
mental costs on extraction programs. The proof is omitted here 
because of its similarity with the no storage case. However, a some­
what surprising result (at least at first blush) awaits us when we 
examine the effect of environmental costs on the optimal consumption 
path and horizon. 
From e quation (13) and substituting for W
1
(I(t) ) we 
obtain 
which implies 
d [ I dt S (q(t))e - rt} 
I a + rS (q(t)) 
q 
S"(q(t)) 
-rt 
ae 
< 0.  
According t o  the terminal time condition in equation ( 15) 
q(T 2) 0 
and the boundary conditions I(O) = I (T 2) O imply 
1T20 q(t)dt Qo. 
( 16) 
( 1 7) 
( 18) 
( 19) 
11. This is true as long as the inventory constraint I(t) :;,, 0 is 
not binding. 
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Taken together equations ( l 7)- ( 19) are sufficient to determine T 2 and
the entire time path of q(t). Note that none of these equations depends 
explicitly on F and therdore the path q(t) and T 2 are independent of 
changes in environmental costs. 
Thus with a change in F, resource consumption proceeds at 
the same pace, despite increases in total above ground storage cost 
caused by the more rapid extraction of the resource. The reason for 
this is that inter- period consumption decisions are based on marginal 
quantities, and the marginal cost of storage is independent of the 
level of inventories. To see this, integrate equation (16) between 0 
and t to obtain 
S 1 (q(t)) S1(q(O))ert + � (ert - 1).r 
With some rearranging we obtain 
-rt ' a e [S (q(t)) + -}r S
1
(q(O)) + Q:. r 
The term fl on both sides of equation (21) is the present value 
r 
(20 ) 
(21)
marginal cost of storing an additional unit of I(t) for an infinitely 
long period. Equation (21) implies that resource consumption is 
allocated across time periods so as to equate the present value of 
marginal returns, including 2': the marginal storage cost avoided by 
r 
current consumption. 
If marginal storage costs increase with inventory size then 
both the extraction and consumption rates increase with increases 
in F. As greater quantities of the r esource are extracted, inventories
accumulate causing an increase in marginal storage costs. Con­
sequently current consumption increases due to the highe r costs of 
keeping re source s for future consumption. Since the mathematics 
11 
of the analysis are quite messy with variable marginal storage costs 
these results are formally established in the Appendix. 
Effects of Increasing Storag e Costs on Optimal Programs 
Retaining the assumption of constant marginal storage costs 
we now examine the effect of an increase in a on optimal resource
programs. 
Extraction Programs 
Consider the optimal program corresponding to different
marginal storage costs a1 and a2 with a1 < a2. Let [ e(t , a1), T 1 (a1)} 
and [e(t, a2), T 1 (a2)} be the corresponding controls for these programs. 
d r -rt -rt From equations (12) and (13) we know that dt[C (e(t))e } = ae 
for t E [O, T 1] whic h implies 
�(al) = 
e(a2) = 
I 
a1 + rC (e(t)) 
C ' (e(t)) 
a2 + rC
1
( e(t)) 
c " (e(t) )
> 0 (22) 
> 0 (23) 
and from equation (l4), e(T 1(a1)) = e(T 1(a2)). Since both programs must
satisfy the resource availability constraint 
J
T1(a) 1 
e(t, a1)dt 
0 
By a change of variable we have 
J
e(Tl(al)) e -;-- de 
e(O a ) e(a ) ' l l 
f T 1 (a2) 
e(t, a2)dL 
0 
= J
e(T l(a2))e -=- de 
e(O a ) e(a ) ' 2 2 
(24) 
(25) 
noting that from equations (22) and (23), e(a ) and �(a7) are both1 :- • 
positive functions of e. Since a1 < a2,for a given e, e(a1) < e(a2)
which implies e(O {<'l) > e(01a2) in equation (25). 
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We can show that e(t , a1) > e(t,a2) for t E [O,T1(a1)] thus
implying T 1(a2) > T 1(a1) by equation (24). For if there exists some 
t
1 
E [O,T1(a1)] such that e(t,a1) > e(t , a2) for t E [O, t 1] and
I I e(t , a1) = e(t , a2) we obtain 
I 
t 
I 
Q
o -J e(t , a1)dt 
0 
0 f t 
< Q - e(t, a2)dt 
or 
J
T 1 (al) 
, e(t, a1)dt <
t 
0 
JT 1 
(a2) 
e(t, a )dt
t I 2 
By a change of variable equation (26) implies 
fe(T l(a l »e .- de < 
e(t 1, a1) 
e(al) 
e(T 1 (a2)) e 
j( ' �(a2 )e t ,ct2) 
which is impossible since e(al) < e (a2 ) as a function of e.
(26) 
(2 7) 
The intuition behind this result is that as above ground storage
costs increase it is economical to store more of the resource under 
ground by slowing the rate of extraction . 
Consumption Programs
Let [q(t , a 1), T2(a1)} and [ q(t, a2), T2(a2)} be the controls for
the optimal consumption programs corresponding to the marginal 
storage costs a1 and a2 with a1 < a2• From equations (17) and (18) 
we obtain 
q(al) = 
q(a2) = 
I 
a + rS (q(t))l < 0 
S"(q(t)) 
a + rS
1
(q(t)) 2 < 0 
S "(q(t)) 
(28) 
(29) 
13 
and q ( T 2 (Cl 1)} 
we obtain 
q(T 2(CY2)) 0. From the resource availability constraint
J
q(O, a1) f q(O, a2) q � dq = -;- dq 
o -q(ci1) 0 -q(a2) 
(30} 
whiCh implies q(O, a2) > q(O, ci1} since -q(ci1} < -q(ci2} as a function of I 
q. Furthermore there exists some t E (0, T2(a2)} such that 
> < 
q(t,cil} q(t, ci2) as t 
I 
t 
< > 
and 
T
2
(e<
2
) < T2(e<l) 
(3 l a) 
(3 l b) 
(3 lc) 
(3ld} 
Since q(O, a1} < q(O, a2) and q(t) is continuous s ome t
' 
exists for which 
I I q(t, a1) = q (t , a2} otherwis e q(t, a1) < q(t, a2} for all t < T 2(ci2} w
hich 
12 
is impossible, thus establishing 3 la and 3lb. Looking at figure 1 
which plots the time paths for q(t, a1) and q(t , a2) it is apparent that
conditions (3 lc} and (3 l d} then follow from the fact that 
\ q(ci1} I > jq(C¥2} \ for a given q. 
12. Because of the time stationarity of our problem, the 
controls q(t) are continuous thr ought time. 
14 
q(t} 
q(t,Cll) 
time 
Figure 1 
Conditions (3 la} - (3 ld} imply that the total amount of the res ource
consumed as of a certain date increases with larger storage costs. 
Cons equently, it is economical to consume the res ource 
more rapidly, but extract it from the ground at a slower pace when 
the above ground s torage cos ts increas e. The bes t  of all worlds from 
both an environmental and energy conservation point of view occurs 
when above ground storage costs are small. Then the environmentalist 
is happy since the extraction horizons decreas e as it becomes cheaper 
to store resources above ground. 
13 E nerg y  conservationis ts are
pleas ed s ince lower storage costs promot:e longer consumption times. 
13. One might argue that environmentalist s hould be indifferent
to the length of the extraction horizon as long as the environmental
costs are being paid. However, in practice the total compensation
for en.,.ironmental damages may not be forthcoming. Also, it is 
unlikely that those individuals who are actually harmed by the
environmental disruption can be identified and fully compensated. 
OPTIMAL PROGRAMS WITH ENVIRONMENTAL 
COSTS FROM RESOURCE CONSUMPTION 
15 
Now consider the case where a degrading of the environment 
occurs as energy resources are used, An example of this is air 
pollution resulting from fuel consumption. Suppose that the 
environmental damage from consumption is reflected by a constant 
per unit tax on energy use. Then the net value of resource 
consumption measured in consumer surplus terms is S(q(t)) - Tq(t) 
where the tax T represents the environmental damage from 
consumption. 
The inclusion of environmental damages in our model is 
formally equivalent to placing an ad valorem tax on energy sales. 
In the case where above ground storage is not possible, it is 
easy to show that the effect of such a tax is to d ecrease the rate of 
resource consumption. 
14 
This is also true for the storage case 
as can be formally demonstrated with a proof similar to that 
used in the previous section to show that consumption rates increase 
with larger storage costs. 
15 
Consequently, the interests of 
environmental and energy conservationists appear to coincide when 
the environmental impacts of resource consumption are included in 
allocation decisions.
14. See Burness (1976). 
15. We are remind ed that it will be economical to st or e 
resources only if there are fixed costs, F, to extraction. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
In considering the environmental impacts of energy programs 
our results suggest that the interests of energy and environmental 
conservationists conflict or coincide depending on whether 
environmental costs result from extracting or consuming the 
resource. Our primary concern has been with the impacts of 
environmental extraction costs. The effect of including environmental 
extraction costs in allocations decisions is to cause an increase in 
resource extraction. Consumption of the resource need not increase 
if above ground storage is possible at constant marginal costs, If 
however, marginal costs increase with inventory size, increases in 
the environmental costs of extraction will ultimately lead to shorter 
consumption times. This result is bound to upset those energy 
conservationist who argue that current energy consumption is alread y 
excessive. 
Of course no such problem exists if environmental impacts 
result from consuming rather than extracting the resource. The 
value of environmental amenities is hard to quantify, yet the 
tradeoffs between the environment and other goods like energy are 
apparent in our discussion. It would not be too surprising to see 
environmental preservation regarded (as it conflicts with resource 
extraction) more as a "luxury good" if the so-called energy crunch 
persists. 
An interesting question we have not considered is the 
intergenerational conflict that may occur if environmental costs are 
included in extraction decisions. Imagine a situation in which 
energy i s to be supplied in a quasi competitive market subject to
government regulated a sse ss:r:1 ent s for envircmmental costs. All else 
being equal, those resources having the s�llest environmental 
17 
impacts from extraction will be taped first. In this regard future
generations will be inheriting a stock of resources for which the 
environmental cost of extraction are high. To account for 
environmental impacts in the present, we may inadvertently leave 
future generations with a lower quality environment, one subject 
to more severe disruptions from energy development. 
18 
APPENDIX 
Consider the storage model where marginal storage costs 
are sensitive to inventory levels and w', W" > O. We shall prove
that as F increases both the extraction and consumption horizons 
decrease. 
Let [ e(t, F.), q(t, F.), T1(F.), T2(F. )} be the optimal1 l l l 
controls corresponding to F
i 
for i = 1, 2 with F 1 < F 2. First, it
is clear that the optimal controls for each value of F must differ if 
for no other reason that the terminal time condition (14) implies 
e(T 1(F 1 ) )  < e(T 1(F2)) and that therefore the controls are not 
identical. 
To establish T1(F1) > T 1(F2) define
rr(F.) J
T 1(F.) 
1 [S(e(t, F.)
' } -rt 
I (t, F.)) - C(e(t, F.) - W (I(t, F.)) e dtl 0 l l l l 
!Tz(Fi) · -rt + fS(-I(t, F.)) - W(I(t, F.)) } e dt 
Tl(Fi) i l 
- F. J
T l (Fi) -rt 
i e dt 0 
V(F.) + F. 8 (F.)l l l 
(A. 1)
(A. 2) 
where V(F.), equal to the first two terms on the right hand side of (Al), l 
are the variable returns for an optimal program corresponding to F. , 
J 
T1(Fi) -rt 
i. 
and F.8(F.) == F. e dt is the total discounted fixed costs l l l 0 
corresponding to Fi. 
Since the programs differ with fixed costs we have
19 
TT(F 1) > V(F 2) - F 1S(F2) (A. 3)
n(F 2) > V(F 1) - F 28(F 1) . (A. 4) 
From (A. 3) we have 
V(Fl) - V(F2) > Fl(8(F l) - 8{F2)) . (A. 5) 
Assume, contrary to our assertion that Tl (F 1) < T 2(F 2). Therefore 
8(F 1) < S(F 2). Since F 2 > Fl' multiplying the right hand side of (A. 5)
by F 2/F 1 still yields the same inequality and we have
V(F 1) - V(F 2) > F 2(8(F 1) - 8(F 2)) (A. 6)
but it can be shown that this contradicts (A. 4) thus T 1(F 1) > T 1 (F 2). 
Now we will show T 2(F 2) < Tl (F 2). Suppose to the contrary
that T2(F2) � T1(F2). From equation (13) and (15) we can establish 
q(F . ) 1 
I I W (I(t, F.) + rS (q{t, F.))l 1 
S"(q(t, F.)) 1 
q(T 2 (Fi)) = 0 
< 0 1, 2 (A. 7)
1, 2 (A. 8)
We have traced some possible paths for q(t, F.) in figure 2, assumingl 
T2{F2) > T2(Fl).
20 
q(t) 
-:J(t,F1) 
t T 1 (F 2) 
L-----'---_1._------'-�-time 
. T 2(F2) 
Figure 2 
If T2(F2) > T2(F1) then clearly
�
there exists some t e[O,T2{F2)] such
that q(t, F 2) > q( t, F 1) for t E (t; T2(F 2)). It is also true that 
q(t, F 2) < q(t, F 1) for some t rt (t, T 2(F 2)) otherwise q{t, F 2) > q{t, F 1)
for all t which is impossible. By continuity of q, we see that
,., ,.. 0 ,., • ,., • 
q(t, F 1) = q(t, F 2) and therefore q(t, F 2) � q(t, F 1), (q is represented
by the slope of q(t) in figure 2). By (A. 1) this implies
,., ,... ,., ,., 
I(t, F 2) _::: I(t, F 1). Also t < Tl {F 2) otherwise if t � T1(F 2) and
A A 
I (t, F 2) _::: I{t , F 1) we have
T2(F2) Tl(Fl) T2(Fl)
I(t, F 2) - f q(t, F 2Jdt < I(t, F 1) + j e(t, F 1)dt - J q(t, F 1)dt = o 
t t t 
which violates the I{T2,(F 2)) 0 constraint,(note that e{t, F 1) = 0 for
t > T 
1
(F1),). Consequently, to satisfy the inventory constraint
I(t,F2) > I(t,Fl) fort"" Tl(F2l·
Thus far we have established that:
,. ,. 
I(t, F 2) < I(t, F 1)
I(T 1(F2), F 2) > I{T 1 {F 2), F 1)
t < T 1(F2).
2 1
(A. 9) 
(A. 10) 
(A. 11) 
To simplify the analyses (the proof still holds without this assumption) 
suppose q(t, F 2) and q{t, F 1) intersect only once at t. Then figure 2, 
(A. 9) and (A. 10) imply 
and
I I I f' q(t , F 1) > q(t , F 2) for some t < .t 
I I 
e(t ,F1) > e(t ,F2)
q(t", F 1) < q(t", F 2)
e(t", F 1) < e(t", F 2) for some t"e(f, T 1(F2))
but this can be shown to violate the first order condition in equation 
(1
2). Consequently T2(F 1) < T2(F2) is im possible. Note that the
same proof a pplies if T 2(F 1) = T 2(F 2) and q(t, F 2) > q(t, F 1) for
t E [f, T 2 (F 2) ]. Using the same type of proof we can also show that
T 2(F 1) = T 2(F 2) with q(t, F 1) s_ q(t, F 2) for all t in some neighborhood
of T 2(F 2) is also impossible. Thus we have eliminated the possibility
of T 2(F 2) � T 2(F 1) and our proof is complete.
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